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I.   INTRODUCTION: THE MEASURE OF MERIT 
 How ought we to select judges? One possibility is that each of us 
should campaign for the selection of judges who will transform our 
own values and interests into law. An alternative is to select judges 
for their excellence—that is, for the possession of the judicial virtues: 
intelligence, wisdom, incorruptibility, sobriety, and justice. In an in-
                                                                                                                     
 * John A. Cribbet Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. I owe 
thanks to both Loyola Marymount University’s Loyola Law School and the University of 
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fluential and provocative series of articles, Stephen Choi and Mitu 
Gulati reject both these options and argue instead for a tournament 
of judges—the selection of judges on the basis of measurable, objec-
tive criteria, which they claim point toward merit and away from pa-
tronage and politics.1 Choi and Gulati have gotten something exactly 
right: judges should be selected on the basis of merit—we want 
judges who are excellent. But Choi and Gulati have gotten something 
crucial terribly wrong: they have mistaken measurability for merit. A 
tournament of judges would be won by judges who possess arbitrary 
luck and the vices of originality and mindless productivity; the con-
test would be lost by those who possess the virtues of justice and 
wisdom. The judicial selection process should not be transformed into 
a game. 
 In Part II, “What Is Judicial Excellence?,” I tackle the tough prob-
lem that Choi and Gulati avoid—the explication of a theory of virtue 
for judges. In Part III, “Discerning Excellence,” I discuss how we can 
tell whether candidates for judicial office are bad, by which I mean 
incompetent, or are truly excellent. Part IV, “The Mismeasurement 
of Virtue,” engages the idea of quantitative measures of judicial per-
formance as a proxy for excellence. Finally, in Part V, “Conclusion: 
The Redemption of Spectacular Failure,” I argue that Choi and Gu-
lati’s idea is a rare and valuable thing—an idea that is both com-
pletely wrong and wonderfully illuminating. One more thing: Choi 
and Gulati focus exclusively on the selection of Justices for the 
United States Supreme Court,2 whereas my discussion will range a 
bit more broadly to include the selection of judges for other courts 
and tribunals. 
II.   WHAT IS JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE? 
 If our enterprise is judicial selection, the immediate question is, 
Who are the best or most excellent judges? Behind that question lies 
a more fundamental issue: What is judicial excellence?  Stated differ-
ently, What makes one judge better than another? Choi and Gulati 
largely beg this fundamental question—focusing instead on particu-
lar metrics of judicial performance. In this Part, I will say a bit about 
why they beg the question and then attempt to remedy this defect in 
their work by sketching a theory of judicial excellence. 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An 
Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004) [hereinafter Choi & 
Gulati, Empirical Ranking]; Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 
CAL. L. REV. 299 (2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Tournament]. 
 2. Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 1, at 300. 
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A. The Problem of Disagreement About Judicial Excellence 
 It may well be the case that there is wide agreement that we 
should select excellent judges but disagreement about what counts as 
judicial virtue. The problem of disagreement about judicial excellence 
is one of the key starting points for Choi and Gulati’s defense of em-
pirical measurement of judicial excellence. Their strategy is to focus 
on a few criteria about which we can agree and which lend them-
selves to quantification. As they put the point: 
While different visions of merit may exist, some are more widely 
held than others. Few would quarrel with the claim that a judge 
who displays productivity, intelligence, and integrity is better than 
one who does not.3 
And Choi and Gulati readily admit that by making this move, their 
proposal would not provide a ranking of judges on the basis of merit, 
skill, or excellence.4 Their ambition is more modest—to do better 
than the status quo by providing some objective measure of judicial 
excellence: 
Our simple measures do not provide a perfect metric for judging 
skill, but that is not the standard at which we are aiming. The goal 
is to demonstrate the availability of a set of objective measures for 
which we can easily collect data and analyze and that would better 
identify, at the outset, a merit-worthy pool of Supreme Court can-
didates.5 
So far, so good. We have two assumptions. First, there is disagree-
ment about the criteria for judicial excellence, and so we ought to 
seek judges who possess those aspects of excellence about which 
there is agreement. Second, of those criteria on which there is wide-
spread agreement, only some lend themselves to quantification, and 
so a “tournament of judges” should focus on the criteria for judicial 
excellence that are measurable. 
 From a normative perspective, what seems quite odd about Choi 
and Gulati’s development of these ideas is that their analysis seems 
driven by the availability of data. That is, Choi and Gulati begin with 
the question, What aspects of judicial performance can we easily 
measure? Only after the measurability question is answered do they 
then ask, What qualities of good judging are the readily available 
metrics likely to measure? Of course, as a way of getting started, this 
method has much to commend itself. If one wants to conduct a tour-
nament of judges, one must work with the data that is available. But 
getting started is one thing, and serious analysis is another. For us to 
                                                                                                                     
 3. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 1, at 27. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. at 29-30. 
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take Choi and Gulati seriously, their analysis needs to be supple-
mented by another step—the specification of the actual criteria for 
judicial excellence. 
 Why is specification of the criteria for judicial excellence neces-
sary? In order to determine whether a tournament of judges will im-
prove judicial selection or make it worse, we need to know how the 
easily measurable aspects of judicial excellence relate to those that 
are difficult to measure. That relationship is crucial, because there is 
no a priori reason for ruling out the possibility that focusing on the 
measurable might have the unintended consequence of favoring 
judges with serious defects. If a tournament of judges were more 
than just pie in the sky and actually began to influence the judicial 
selection process, there is the further concern that an emphasis on 
measurable criteria as the determinants of judicial selection might 
actually make judges and their decisions worse rather than better. 
From both the theoretical and the pragmatic standpoints, an answer 
to the fundamental normative question—What makes for excellence 
in judging?—is essential. 
B.   The (Mostly) Uncontested Judicial Virtues (and Vices) 
 Choi and Gulati make an important point when they note that 
there is disagreement about the qualities that make for good judging. 
In recent years, quite a bit of judicial selection has largely been 
driven by the preference of political actors for certain outcomes on 
key issues (abortion, affirmative action, and so forth), and hence ide-
ology has played a major role in judicial selection.6 Nonetheless, it 
may be possible to identify a set of judicial excellences on which there 
is likely to be widespread agreement. 
 Whereas Choi and Gulati work backwards, from measurability to 
virtue, we shall work forwards, starting with the notion of judicial 
virtue. By “virtue” I mean a dispositional quality of mind or charac-
ter that is constitutive of human excellence, and the “judicial virtues” 
include both the human virtues that are relevant to judging and any 
particular virtues that are associated with the social role of judges. 
We begin with an account of those judicial virtues upon which we can 
mostly agree—which I shall call the “uncontested judicial virtues,” or 
more accurately, “the mostly uncontested judicial virtues.” “Uncon-
tested” in this context reflects the notion that these virtues are based 
                                                                                                                     
 6. With respect to ideology, judicial selection is arguably a zero-sum game. That is, 
pro-choice political actors (especially interest groups that focus on the issue) have little to 
gain from the appointment of a pro-life judge who possesses other fine qualities. And vice 
versa, pro-life political actors have little to gain from the appointment of pro-choice judges, 
even if they have many other virtues. Of course, abortion is not the only issue, but many 
such issues cluster together, which makes a simple left-right model of political ideology 
useful both analytically and empirically. 
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on noncontroversial assumptions about what counts as good judging 
and on widely accepted beliefs about human nature and social real-
ity; the qualifier “mostly” reflects the fact that even an account of ju-
dicial excellence based on widely shared assumptions will be con-
tested by some. 
 How can we get at the zone of agreement about judicial excel-
lence? While there is a good deal of argument about which judges are 
the best, there is actually an astonishing amount of consensus about 
two related questions, Who are the very worst judges? and What are 
the worst judicial vices? No one thinks that the best judges are cor-
rupt, drunk, cowardly, foolish, or stupid. This consensus suggests a 
strategy for articulating a theory of the uncontested judicial virtues. 
Let us begin with the worst judicial vices and identify the character-
istics that are necessary to correct those defects. These characteris-
tics will constitute the uncontested judicial virtues. 
1.   Judicial Incorruptibility and Judicial Sobriety 
 One judicial vice on which there is likely to be near universal 
agreement is “corruption.” Judges who sell their votes undermine the 
substantive goals of the law, because corrupt decisions are at least as 
likely to be wrong as they are to be substantively correct. Moreover, 
corrupt decisions undermine the rule-of-law values of productivity 
and uniformity of legal decisions and likewise undermine public re-
spect for the law and public acceptance of the law as legitimate. 
 Almost anyone with common sense is likely to accept the conclu-
sion that judicial corruption is a vice. If we accept judicial corruption 
is a vice, then what is the corresponding virtue? This question could 
become complex—because there are a variety of character flaws that 
might lead to corruption. One such flaw that may be an underlying 
cause of corruption is greed (or pleonexia)—because a desire for more 
than one’s share (or entitlement) could lead a judge to accept bribes. 
All humans are at risk of mistaking wealth (which can only be a 
means) for a final end (something worth pursuing for its own sake). 
Some judges may resent the fact that they receive compensation that 
is sometimes only a fraction of that received by their peers in private 
legal practice—some of whom may be less talented. 
 We do not need to identify all of the possible vices that could lead 
to corruption in order to see that incorruptibility is an uncontested 
judicial virtue. There is no real controversy over the proposition that 
judges should be disposed to resist the temptations that lead to cor-
ruption. We call this disposition the “judicial virtue of incorruptibil-
ity,” even if it turns out that this virtue encompasses a variety of par-
ticular virtues each of which corresponds to a particular human vice 
that could lead to corruption. 
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 There is another vice that is closely related to corruption but dis-
tinct from greed. Judges can become corrupted because their desires 
are not in order—because they crave pleasure or the status conferred 
by the possession of fine things. Judges, like the rest of us, can be 
corrupted by a taste for designer shoes, fast cars, loose companions, 
or intoxicating substances. More subtly, a judge could be corrupted 
by a desire for the finer things of life, for example, a magnificent 
home, the ability to confer lavish gifts upon one’s children, or the op-
portunity for luxurious travel.  
 Let us use some old-fashioned terminology and call the vice of dis-
orderly desire “intemperance.” One might argue that intemperance is 
a purely private vice—that a judge’s preference for a third cosmopoli-
tan, the latest from Jimmy Choo or Manolo Blahnik, or the company 
of good looking youthful companions is her own business and hence 
irrelevant to the question whether she is an excellent judge. Of 
course, a proportionate and well-ordered desire for such things is 
simply not a vice—or at least not an uncontested vice. But a disposi-
tion to disproportionate desires for such pleasures can lead to more 
than corruption. Most obviously, a judge who is intoxicated (or high) 
on the bench is likely to be prone to error. The disordinate pursuit of 
less-intoxicating pleasures can also impair judicial performance—by 
focusing a judge’s attention and energy away from judicial tasks. 
 There is a counterargument. It is a common human experience to 
have a friend, colleague, or acquaintance who is intemperate but 
nonetheless “gets the job done”—and who even performs brilliantly 
at times. Who has not encountered the lawyer who is a star by day 
but a lush in the wee hours or the friend whose life at work still 
holds together despite a drug problem? So, the argument goes, in-
temperance is not a judicial vice—at least not until it interferes with 
the performance of judicial duty. Even if the intemperate judicial 
candidate is a disaster at home, her intemperance should not dis-
qualify her from judicial office if she performs at the office. This 
counterargument is ultimately unpersuasive. Of course, an intem-
perate judge can get lucky and “get away with it,” either appearing to 
do well or even actually doing well despite disordered desires. But in 
such cases “getting away with it” is a matter of luck; an intemperate 
judge is simply not reliable. A really damaging misstep is always just 
one cosmopolitan away. 
 The virtue that corresponds to the vice of intemperance could be 
called temperance, in the classical sense that encompasses the order-
ing of all the natural desires. But I propose that we use another term 
to refer to the judicial form of temperance. We have a saying that 
captures the intuitive sense that judges must have their desires in 
order: we say of a temperate human that she or he is “sober as a 
judge,” and this suggests that we name this virtue “judicial sobriety.” 
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2.   Judicial Courage 
 Fear is one of the most powerful and familiar of the emotions. The 
disposition to feel too much fear makes us cowardly; the disposition 
to insufficient fear makes us rash. Courage represents a mean be-
tween cowardice and rashness. Let’s call the judicial form of this vir-
tue “judicial courage.” 
 We might usefully subdivide the virtue of courage into two parts—
which I shall call “physical courage” and “civic courage.” That judges 
need physical courage in order to be excellent as judges is a lamenta-
ble fact in many societies. We have recently been reminded of this 
fact by the tragic experiences of federal district judge Joan Lefkow, 
who was threatened by one defendant and whose husband and 
mother were murdered by a party to another case.7 A judge who 
could be intimidated by threats of physical violence could not reliably 
do justice in our relatively peaceful society—much less under condi-
tions in which violence (or threats of violence) is even more preva-
lent, as may be the case where narcoterrorism or ethnic conflict is 
pervasive. 
 Judicial courage has a second dimension. Judges, like most hu-
mans, care about their reputations and social standing. Like the rest 
of us, judges seek the approval and companionship of their fellows. 
So, in addition to physical danger, judges may fear consequences of 
their actions that threaten status and social approval. This fear is 
dangerous because the law may require judges to make unpopular 
decisions. A judge who ordered school integration in the South might 
be shunned socially. In societies where the judicial branch wields 
significant power in cases involving hot-button issues (abortion, end-
of-life disputes, and so forth), there will be occasions where doing 
what the law requires may be profoundly unpopular. For this reason, 
judges need the virtue of civic courage—the disposition to put the re-
gard of one’s fellows in its proper place and to take it into account in 
the right way, on the right occasions, and for the right reasons. A 
judge with this virtue will not be tempted to sacrifice justice on the 
altar of public opinion. A civically courageous judge understands that 
the good opinion of others is worth having if it flows from having 
done justice and that social approval for injustice is an impermissible 
motive for judicial action. 
                                                                                                                     
 7. Susan Estrich, Now Is a Tough Time to Be a Judge, SUN NEWS (Myrtle Beach), Mar. 25, 
2005, available at http://www.myrtlebeachonline.com/mld/sunnews/news/opinion/11226003.htm 
(stating that “everyone was shaken up by what happened to the Lefkow family in Chi-
cago, the cold-blooded murder of a judge’s husband and aged mother”); Pam Hartman, 
How Anger Turns to ‘Social Rage,’ MOBILE REG., Apr. 3, 2005, available at 
http://www.al.com/opinion/mobileregister/index.ssf?/base/opinion/1112545146171620.xml (dis-
cussing murders caused by anger at judges). 
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3.   Judicial Temperament and Impartiality 
 Like fear, anger is an emotion both familiar and powerful.8 
Judges, like the rest of us, may be hot-tempered or cool and collected. 
And, like the rest of us, judges are likely to find themselves in situa-
tions where a hot temper could produce intemperate actions. This is 
especially true of trial judges, who are given the task of maintaining 
order in what may become emotionally charged circumstances. Liti-
gants may ignore judicial authority or act with disrespect. Some law-
yers may deliberately attempt to provoke the judge in order to elicit 
legal mistakes or “on the record” behavior that displays animus to-
ward a party, which may serve as the basis for an appeal. In the face 
of such provocations, a judge with an anger management problem 
may “fly off the handle.” Intemperate judicial behavior may lead the 
judge to misapply the law or to distort the applicable legal standards 
in “the heat of anger.” Moreover, a hotheaded judge may become par-
tial—pulling against the party who is the object of anger and display-
ing favoritism to that party’s opponent. 
 Aristotle identified proates, or “good temper,” as the corrective vir-
tue for the vice of bad temper. In the judicial context, this virtue is so 
important that we have a phrase that expresses the virtue as a dis-
tinctively judicial form of excellence—“judicial temperament.” This 
phrase reflects our sense that the virtue of “good temper” is essential 
for good judging. 
 Is judicial temperament also required for judges who do not su-
pervise trials? Appellate judges work in a cooler environment—
provocative behavior by appellate lawyers is rare, although not un-
known. The parties to an appellate proceeding frequently do not ap-
pear, and if they do, they sit in the audience without any formal par-
ticipation in the appellate process itself. Some appellate courts pro-
ceed almost entirely on the basis of the briefs, dispensing with oral 
argument and hence with the opportunity for “live and in person” 
provocations. Nonetheless, good temper is essential for excellence in 
appellate judging. Appellate judges hear cases in panels or en banc—
which create opportunities for friction among the judges themselves. 
Hot tempers can destroy collegiality and, with it, the opportunity for 
compromise and mutual understanding. Moreover, even a brief can 
elicit anger, and if anger becomes rage, it can have a blinding effect, 
depriving the judge of the ability to recognize the merits of an argu-
ment or a weakness in the judge’s own conception of the legal issues 
in a case. 
                                                                                                                     
 8. My view of the virtue of temperance has been improved by recent work by Nancy Sherman. 
See Nancy Sherman, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Kant on Anger (Mar. 21, 2005) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://asweb.artsci.uc.edu/philosophy/news/colloqPresentations/Sherman.pdf. 
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 If excessive anger is a vice, then what about its opposite? Is there 
a vice of deficiency with respect to anger? The Stoics are famous for 
answering this question in the negative; we might say that for the 
Stoics, the disposition to feel anger in any circumstances is a vice.9 
The contrary view is that proportionate anger serves a valuable func-
tion—it alerts us to wrongs and motivates us to respond to them. A 
simple way of framing the issue is to ask which character from the 
1960s television series Star Trek would make the best judge—
Captain Kirk, Dr. McCoy, or Mr. Spock. Mr. Spock resembles the 
Stoic sage—he feels no anger and acts only on the basis of logic; we 
imagine Judge Spock reacting with equanimity to even the most se-
vere courtroom provocations. Dr. McCoy is hot-tempered; we imagine 
him flying off the handle in response to outrageous behavior by the 
lawyer for a greedy corporation. Captain Kirk represents a mean be-
tween these two extremes; we imagine Judge Kirk as appropriately 
outraged by bad behavior and injustice but nonetheless remaining 
“in control,” and responding in an appropriate manner. The virtue of 
judicial temperament consists in having appropriate anger—anger 
for the right reasons, on the right occasions, and with a clear under-
standing of the consequences of its expression. 
 More concretely, when a party flouts the law or disrespects the 
participants in a legal proceeding, anger may be appropriate. Such 
appropriate anger alerts the judge to the existence of a situation that 
must be dealt with. In some circumstances, the judge will properly 
display such anger, giving a lawyer, party, or witness a stern warn-
ing. When someone persists in bad conduct, sanctions may be war-
ranted; in such cases, giving an appropriate sanction is the right way 
to act on the basis of appropriate anger. But judges with the virtue of 
judicial temperament will not display their anger by ruling against 
an offending party on issues that are close or by exercising discretion 
on incidental matters so as to disfavor the anger-provoking party. 
 One reason that anger is an especially dangerous vice for judges is 
that anger can produce bias. For this reason, the virtue of judicial 
temperament is closely related to another judicial virtue, “judicial 
impartiality.” This virtue is a familiar feature of our conception of 
good judging. We want judges to be neutral arbitrators. A judge 
should be open to the law and evidence and not be biased in favor of 
one side or another. Such impartiality should extend not just to the 
parties but should also encompass the causes, movements, special in-
terests, and ideologies that may be associated with those parties. 
When a judge takes the bench or lifts her pen to write an opinion, she 
                                                                                                                     
 9. See 6 PLUTARCH, MORALIA 89-160 (W.C. Helmbold trans., 1927) (reprinting and 
translating Plutarch’s essay, On the Control of Anger); 1 SENECA, MORAL ESSAYS 106-355 
(John W. Basore trans., 1928) (reprinting and translating Seneca’s essay, On Anger). 
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should put aside her allegiance to left or right, liberal or conserva-
tive, religiosity or secularism. 
 It is a mistake, however, to view impartiality as synonymous with 
disinterest. The virtue of impartiality is not cold-blooded. This is be-
cause the role of judge requires insight and understanding into the 
human condition. A good judge perceives the law and facts from a 
human perspective. Some facts are hot—charged with emotional sa-
lience. Some legal rules are morally charged—engaging our sense of 
indignation when juxtaposed with violative behavior. So the impar-
tial judge is not cold-blooded; she is not indifferent to the parties that 
come before her. Rather, the judge with the virtue of judicial impar-
tiality has evenhanded sympathy for all the parties to a dispute. 
When we say that impartiality is not indifference, we mean that the 
virtue of impartiality requires both sympathy and empathy without 
taking sides or favoring the legitimate interests of one side over 
those of the other. 
4.   Diligence and Carefulness 
 Judging is hard work, involving its share of drudgery. Some trials 
are long and boring. Some opinions require long hours of research 
and even longer hours of careful drafting. The temptation to shirk 
this work is accentuated by the fact that judges are not (and should 
not be) closely supervised. And the lack of supervision is compounded 
in jurisdictions that grant judges life tenure or long terms in office. It 
is hard enough to remove a judge for outright corruption; one doubts 
that any American judge has been removed on the basis of sloth 
alone. But slothful or lazy judges can do real harm. They are tempted 
to delegate too much responsibility to judicial clerks, substituting the 
judgment of the clerk for the judge’s own intellectual engagement 
with the case. Another temptation is to shape one’s decision in order 
to minimize one’s own workload. If granting the summary judgment 
motion takes a case off one’s docket, the slothful judge might grant 
the motion for that reason alone, sacrificing justice on the altar of 
expediency. 
 What is the virtue that corresponds to the vice of sloth? We might 
call it diligence. The diligent judge has the right attitude toward ju-
dicial work, finding judicial tasks engaging and rewarding. But more 
than a good attitude is required. An excellent judge must have an 
appropriate “energy level”—a product of both physical and mental 
health. The combination of these traits should translate into a judge 
who is capable of hard work when hard work is required. Such a 
judge will put in the required hours and sweat out the difficult tasks. 
Such a judge will not hesitate to make the right decision, even if that 
makes more work for the judge. Nowadays, encouraging settlements 
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may be an appropriate activity for judges, but a diligent judge will 
aim for just and efficient settlements and not for resolutions that 
serve the judge’s own convenience. 
 Carefulness is closely related to diligence. No one can sensibly 
doubt that judicial carelessness is a vice. Careless decisions, careless 
drafting, careless research—any of these can lead to substantive in-
justice. Carefulness is especially important in the context of judging, 
because excellent judging frequently requires meticulous attention to 
details. The lazy judge may shirk the unpleasant task of mastering 
the structure of a complex statute or avoid the painstaking task of 
making sense of a tangled body of precedent. Likewise, it requires 
diligence and care to draft an opinion in which each and every sen-
tence is worded with careful appreciation of the importance of preci-
sion and accuracy. An excellent judge has an eye for detail and a de-
votion to precision. 
5.   Judicial Intelligence and Learnedness 
 Can anyone doubt that stupidity is a judicial vice? All humans 
need intelligence to function well—but some tasks require more in-
telligence on more occasions. Judging is the kind of task that almost 
always requires smartness and sometimes requires extraordinary in-
telligence. Both law and facts can be complex. Only a judge with in-
telligence will be able to sort out the complexities of the rule against 
perpetuities or penetrate the mysteries of a complex statute. But 
more than intelligence is required. A truly excellent judge must also 
be learned in the law, because one cannot start from scratch in each 
and every case and because there is at least some truth to the notion 
that the law is a seamless web. In terms of the corresponding judicial 
vices, stupid and ignorant judges will be error-prone, likely to mis-
understand and misstate the law, and unlikely to make findings of 
fact that are correct. 
 The need for judicial intelligence and learnedness is accentuated 
rather than diminished in an adversary system. It is true that good 
lawyering makes a judge’s job easier; the lawyers can identify the 
relevant issues and call the judge’s attention to the best arguments 
on each side of those issues that are in dispute. But in an adversary 
system, successful advocates will try to make a bad case appear bet-
ter by deploying sophistry and rhetoric. Intelligent and learned 
judges can “see through” the obfuscation. 
6.   Craft and Skill 
 So far, our investigation has focused on what Aristotle called the 
moral and intellectual virtues. These are dispositions of character 
and mind that make for human excellence. Good judging requires 
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more than good character and intellectual ability. That is because 
judging includes elements of craft, and therefore a good judge must 
possess a skill set—the particular learned abilities that are to good 
judging what good bowing technique is to archery or good draftsman-
ship is to architecture. A full account of judicial craft is far beyond 
the scope of this Essay, but one particular aspect of judicial craft and 
skill demands attention. Excellence in judging (especially good appel-
late judging) requires particular skill in the use of language. Good 
judges must be good communicators. This aspect of judicial skill in-
cludes at least two parts—oral and written. It is obvious that trial 
judges need good oral communication skills; they must deliver a va-
riety of oral instructions to the various participants in both trial and 
pretrial proceedings. Among these, jury instructions are particularly 
important. Written communication skills are especially important for 
appellate judges in a common law system, because of the doctrine of 
stare decisis. Because appellate opinions set precedent, a badly writ-
ten opinion can misstate the law or state the law in a misleading 
way. A really well-drafted opinion, on the other hand, can clarify the 
obscure and illuminate the meaning of murky legal texts. 
 Good communication skills are also important to judges when 
they mediate between the parties to a dispute. A skilled judge can 
gain the trust and cooperation of the parties—resorting to the threat 
of sanctions only in those rare cases where force is truly necessary. 
In this way, good communication skills can increase the efficiency of 
judicial proceedings, allowing the judge to focus her attention on 
those issues and cases where settlement and cooperative processes 
are unavailing. 
C.   The (Mostly) Contestable Judicial Virtues 
 One advantage of a theory of judicial excellence is that it reveals a 
large zone of agreement. For all practical purposes, we can agree that 
judges should be incorruptible, courageous, good-tempered, diligent, 
skilled, and smart. But these (mostly uncontested) virtues do not tell 
the whole story about judicial excellence. Even if we agree in our 
judgments about who the very worst judges are—the corrupt, ill-
tempered, cowardly, lazy, incompetent, and stupid ones—there are 
strong and persistent disagreements about who the best judges are. 
The partisans of Lord Coke may deride the accomplishments of Lord 
Mansfield; the admirers of Justice Brennan may be among the critics 
of Justice Scalia. This Part investigates the source of these dis-
agreements about judicial excellence. 
 Once again, my strategy is to examine the judicial virtues. In par-
ticular, I shall argue that disagreements about judicial excellence are 
typically rooted in two disagreements about the nature of judicial 
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virtue. The first disagreement is about the nature of the virtue of jus-
tice. The second disagreement concerns the role of equity and practi-
cal wisdom. On the one hand, some disagreements about judicial ex-
cellence turn out to be disagreements about and within conceptions 
of the virtue of justice. On the other hand, further controversies 
about which judges are best hang on differences in the understand-
ing of the role of practical wisdom in judging. 
 Although there are important disagreements about the virtues of 
justice and practical wisdom, there are certainly agreements as well. 
When stated at a high level of generality and abstraction, these vir-
tues will command near universal assent. Almost everyone will agree 
that an excellent judge must be just (rather than unjust) and wise 
(rather than foolish). Let’s borrow the concept/conception distinc-
tion.10 We might say that there is agreement that the concept of the 
virtue of justice is required for judicial excellence, but that there is 
disagreement about which conception of the virtue of justice is best 
(or correct or most adequate). And likewise with the virtue of practi-
cal wisdom—we agree on the concept, but disagree about which con-
ception of equity is the best one. 
1.   Competing Conceptions of the Virtue of Justice 
 What does the virtue of justice require? To answer this question, 
let us examine two different conceptions of the virtue of justice: jus-
tice as fairness and justice as lawfulness. (For short, I will use the 
phrases “the fairness conception” and “the lawfulness conception” to 
refer to these ideas.) I shall argue that conceptualizing the virtue of 
justice as fairness necessitates intractable disagreements about 
which judges are excellent, and that the competing conception, which 
emphasizes the idea that excellent judges are lawful, opens the door 
to agreement in judgments about who is just.  
(a)   Justice as Fairness 
 One influential conception of the virtue of justice is premised on 
the idea that the just and the lawful are separate and distinct. Of 
course, the view is not that all laws are unjust or that no just norms 
are law. Rather, the idea is that there is no necessary connection be-
tween legality and justice.11 If this were so, then the most plausible 
conception of the virtue of justice might be articulated as follows: 
                                                                                                                     
 10. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 73-76 (1986); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 4-5 (rev. ed. 1999); W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. 
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167 (1956). 
 11. This conception of the virtue of justice bears an affinity to the separation thesis—
a central tenet of legal positivism. Cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994) 
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The Virtue of Justice as Fairness: A judge, J, has the virtue of jus-
tice as fairness, V(j-f), if and only if J is disposed to act in accord 
with the best conception of fairness, F, in situations, S, where fair-
ness provides salient reasons for action. 
One might think that a judge who possessed V(j-f) would ignore the 
law altogether, but this is not the case. If this thought were correct, 
it would provide the basis for a devastating objection to the fairness 
conception—because it would require each judge to substitute her 
private judgments about what fairness requires for the duly enacted 
constitutions, statutes, and rules. Although I shall not provide the 
argument here, it seems plain that this would be a recipe for chaos.12 
 But a defender of the fairness conception need not admit that a 
judge who acted on the basis of fairness would disregard the law en-
tirely. Why not? Because the existence of legal norms will frequently 
give rise to considerations of fairness that will transform the moral 
landscape, creating salient reasons of fairness that motivate a judge 
who has V(j-f) to act in accord with the law. An example may help to 
clarify and illustrate this point. Suppose there is a dispute between 
Ben and Alice over Greenacre—a vacant and unimproved parcel of 
land. The law gives Ben title to Greenacre, which he has purchased, 
but Alice has begun to use Greenacre by planting a garden. In the 
absence of the institution of property law, it might be the case that 
Ben would have no claim on Greenacre—how would he acquire such 
a claim without some use or improvement of the land? But given the 
existence of property law, Ben would have a claim of fairness, be-
cause he has paid for Greenacre and has reasonably relied on the le-
gal institution of property. If this is so, then the law has created a 
claim of fairness that otherwise would not exist, and a judge with 
V(j-f) would decide in favor of Ben—assuming, of course, that there 
were no other circumstances that created an overriding reason of 
fairness to decide in favor of Alice. 
 Nonetheless, the fairness conception faces a formidable objection 
because of the role that private judgment plays for judges with V(j-f). 
To articulate this objection, we need to highlight the distinction be-
tween two questions about fairness—which I shall call “first order” 
and “second order” questions of fairness. A first-order question of 
fairness is simply the question, Which action is fair given the circum-
stances? A second-order question of fairness concerns whose judg-
                                                                                                                     
(discussing legal positivism and the separation thesis, but not in the context of the virtue 
of justice). 
 12. Of course, there may be some theorists who believe that judges do and should act 
on the basis of their sense of fairness rather than the law. Moreover, those who adhere to 
the radical or strong indeterminacy thesis contend that the law never constrains the 
choices of judges. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical 
Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987). 
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ment about first-order questions will be taken as authoritative. Thus, 
the question—Given the fact of disagreement about the correct an-
swer to a first-order question of fairness, whose judgment should be 
taken as authoritative?—is a second-order question of fairness. One 
possible answer to a second-order question of fairness is that one 
ought to rely on one’s own private judgment about what action is fair. 
A quite different answer is that one should rely on some source of 
public judgment. For example, one might rely on duly enacted and 
public laws. 
 The fairness conception implicitly requires judges to exercise pri-
vate judgment about first-order questions of fairness. In exercising 
that judgment, the judge may conclude that expectations generated 
by reasonable reliance on the law provide reasons of fairness—as in 
the case of Ben, Alice, and Greenacre—but this is a conclusion of pri-
vate judgment. One judge might conclude that Ben’s reliance on 
property law was reasonable and hence that fairness required a deci-
sion for Ben. A different judge might conclude that no one could rea-
sonably rely on property law in cases in which they were allowing 
valuable land to lie fallow when others could make productive use of 
the land—and therefore decide for Alice. Yet a third judge might con-
clude that because of pervasive economic inequalities, the whole in-
stitution of property is unjust and award the land to a third party, 
Carla, who was in greater need than either Ben or Alice. Because 
each judge makes a private judgment about the all-things-considered 
fairness of following the law in each case, these judgments can (and 
we expect will) differ with the moral, religious, and ideological views 
of the particular judge. 
 The objection to the fairness conception of the virtue of justice is 
that disagreements in private judgments about fairness would un-
dermine the very great values that we associate with the rule of law. 
Because the fairness conception requires each judge to exercise her 
own private judgment about what fairness requires—all things con-
sidered—and because such judgments will frequently differ, the out-
come of disputes adjudicated by judges with V(j-f) will be systemati-
cally unpredictable. If this were the case, then the law would be un-
able to perform the function of coordinating behavior, creating stable 
expectations, and constraining arbitrary or self-interested actions by 
officials. How bad this would be is a matter of dispute. A Hobbesian 
answer to this question is that it would be very bad indeed—in the 
absence of a coordinating authority, life would be “solitary, poore, 
nasty, brutish, and short.”13 A Lockean answer is that reliance on 
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private judgment leads to “inconveniences,”14 but even an optimistic 
realist would surely concede that the inconvenience of a society that 
cannot secure the rule of law would be serious. 
 We are now in a position to apply what we have learned about the 
fairness conception to judicial selection. If the fairness conception 
were correct, then the excellent judges would be those who have the 
right beliefs about fairness and who are disposed to act on those be-
liefs. If we agreed on the content of the right beliefs about fairness, 
this would not be a problem, but we do not agree. So the fairness con-
ception leads to disagreement about who has the virtue of justice. We 
can provide a crude translation of this point into the language of po-
litical ideologies of the left and right. For the left, only left-wing 
judges are just; because only left-wing judges have what the left con-
siders true beliefs about what fairness requires. And, of course, for 
the right, the left-wing judges are unjust precisely because they have 
what the right considers false beliefs about fairness. Even the uncon-
tested virtues—such as incorruptibility or courage—become prob-
lematic once the fairness conception has been accepted. For the left, 
an intelligent, diligent, and courageous right-wing judge may be 
worse than one who lacks a keen intellect, is somewhat lazy, and is 
susceptible to the pressures of public opinion. And for the right, these 
same concerns exist with respect to left-wing judges. 
 Another weakness of the fairness conception is that anyone who 
holds it is naturally tempted to apply a double standard of judicial 
excellence. The double standard works like this: 
For judges with whom I agree, the fairness conception supplies the 
content of the virtue of justice. Right-thinking judges are excellent 
when they act on the basis of their convictions about what is fair. 
But when it comes to judges with whom I disagree, a different 
standard applies. Wrong-thinking judges are excellent when they 
stick to the rules. For them, the lawfulness conception provides the 
standard for the virtue of justice. 
You may say that position is ludicrous; no one could hold such a bla-
tantly inconsistent set of positions about the meaning of justice. In 
reply, I suggest that you pay careful attention to the political rhetoric 
that attends debates about judicial roles and judicial selection. 
(b)   Justice as Lawfulness 
 If the fairness conception of the virtue of justice is unsatisfactory, 
is there an alternative? In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle sug-
gests an alternative understanding of justice as lawfulness, but to 
                                                                                                                     
 14. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 276 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
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understand Aristotle’s view, we need to take a look at the Greek 
word nomos, which is usually translated as “law.” For the ancient 
Greeks, nomos had a broader meaning than does “law” in contempo-
rary English. Richard Kraut, the distinguished Aristotle scholar, ex-
plained the difference as follows: 
[W]hen [Aristotle] says that a just person, speaking in the broadest 
sense, is nomimos, he is attributing to such a person a certain rela-
tionship to the laws, norms, and customs generally accepted by 
some existing community. Justice has to do not merely with the 
written enactments of a community’s lawmakers, but with the 
wider set of norms that govern the members of that community. 
Similarly, the unjust person’s character is expressed not only in 
his violations of the written code of laws, but more broadly, in his 
transgression of the rules accepted by the society in which he lives. 
 There is another important way in which Aristotle’s use of the 
term nomos differs from our word ‘law’: he makes a distinction be-
tween nomoi and what the Greeks of his time called psēphis-
mata—conventionally translated as ‘decrees’. A decree is a legal 
enactment addressed solely to present circumstances, and sets no 
precedent that applies to similar cases in the future. By contrast, a 
nomos is meant to have general scope: it applies not only to cases 
at hand but to a general category of cases that can be expected to 
occur in the future.15 
We can restate this last point by using our distinction between types 
of judgments (first- and second-order, private and public). If judges 
rely on their own first-order private judgments of fairness as the ba-
sis for the resolution of disputes, then it follows inexorably that their 
judgments will be decrees (psēphismata) and not decisions on the ba-
sis of a second-order public judgment—in other words, not on the ba-
sis of a nomos. A judge who decides on the basis of her own private 
judgments about which outcome is fair—all things considered—is 
making decisions that are tyrannical in Aristotle’s sense. 
 How can this be?, you may ask. Are not decisions that are moti-
vated by fairness the very opposite of tyranny? But framing the ques-
tion in this way obscures rather than illuminates the point. Of 
course, if there were universal agreement (or even a strong consen-
sus) of first-order private judgments about fairness, then decisions on 
the basis of such judgments would be nomoi and not psēphismata. 
But our first-order private judgments about the all-things-considered 
requirements of fairness do not agree. So in any given case, a deci-
sion that the judge believes is required by fairness will be seen by 
others quite differently. At best, the decision will be viewed as a 
good-faith error of private judgment about fairness. More likely, 
those who disagree will describe the decision as a product of ideology, 
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personal preference, or bias. At worst, the decision will be perceived 
as the product of arbitrary will or self-interest. In no event will a de-
cision based on a controversial first-order private judgment of fair-
ness be viewed as the outcome of a nomos—a publicly available legal 
norm. 
 We are now in a better position to appreciate why rule by decree 
(psēphismata) is typical of tyranny. Decision on the basis of first-
order private judgments about fairness is the rule of individuals and 
not of law. From Aristotle’s point of view, a regime that rules by de-
cree does not provide the stability and certainty that is required for 
human communities to flourish.16 Kraut elaborates on this point: 
 We can now begin to see why Aristotle thinks that justice in its 
broadest sense can be defined as lawfulness, and why he has such 
high regard for a lawful person. His definition embodies the as-
sumption that every community requires the high degree of order 
that comes from having a stable body of customs and norms, and a 
coherent legal code that is not altered frivolously and unpredicta-
bly. Justice in its broadest sense is the intellectual and emotional 
skill one needs in order to do one’s part in bringing it about that 
one’s community possesses this stable system of rules and laws.17 
And with that point in place, we can now formulate the lawfulness 
conception of the virtue of justice: 
The Virtue of Justice as Lawfulness: A judge, J, has the virtue of 
justice as lawfulness, V(j-l), if and only if J is disposed to act in ac-
cord with the nomoi (positive laws and stable customs and norms), 
N, in situations, S, where the nomoi provide salient reasons for ac-
tion. 
On the lawfulness conception, the virtue of justice does not require 
action in conformity with one’s first-order private judgments of fair-
ness. Justice as lawfulness is based on a second-order judgment that 
judges (or, more generally, citizens) should rely on public judgments. 
The content of the public judgments are the nomoi—the positive laws 
and shared norms of a given community. Someone with the virtue of 
justice is disposed to act on the basis of the nomoi. In other words, 
the lawfulness conception holds that the excellent judge is a nomi-
mos, someone who grasps the importance of lawfulness and is dis-
posed to act on the basis of the laws and norms of her community.  
 We are now in a position to compare the fairness conception and 
the lawfulness conception. Which of these offers a more satisfactory 
conception of the virtue of justice? On the surface, it might appear 
that the fairness conception is more satisfactory—after all, who can 
                                                                                                                     
 16. Id. at 106. 
 17. Id. 
2005]              A TOURNAMENT OF VIRTUE 1383 
 
deny that we ought to do what fairness requires, all things consid-
ered? Although there is much more to be said in a full account of 
these matters, the argument advanced here provides good reasons to 
doubt that the fairness conception can offer a satisfactory account of 
the virtue of justice. A view of justice must take into account the dis-
tinctions between first- and second-order judgments and between 
public and private judgments. Once these distinctions are intro-
duced, the need for second-order agreement on a public standard of 
judgment becomes clear. The lawfulness conception of the virtue of 
justice answers this need; the fairness conception does not. 
2.   Competing Conceptions of Equity and Practical Wisdom 
 But the virtue of justice may not be exhausted by the lawfulness 
conception. Even if we concede that in ordinary cases justice requires 
adherence to the law, the question remains whether there are ex-
traordinary cases—cases in which excellent judges would depart 
from the law (or, to put it differently, decide that the law does not 
really apply). Even if first-order private judgment cannot do the work 
of filling in the content of a general conception of the virtue of justice, 
that does not necessarily imply that the judge’s sense of fairness has 
no role to play.  
 One reason we might doubt the adequacy of the lawfulness con-
ception as the whole story about the virtue of justice flows from the 
fact that the positive law is cast in the form of abstract and general 
rules; such rules may lead to results that are unfair in those particu-
lar cases that do not fit the pattern contemplated by the formulation 
of the rule. If lawfulness were the whole story about the virtue of jus-
tice, then an excellent judge would apply the rule “come hell and high 
water,” even if the rule led to consequences that were absurd or 
manifestly unjust. But this implication of the lawfulness conception 
seems odd and unsatisfactory. Another way of conceptualizing this 
concern is to distinguish between two styles of rule application, 
which I shall call “mechanical” and “sensitive.” 
 Does the excellent judge apply the rules in a rigid and mechanical 
way? Or does a virtuous judge correct the rigidity of the lawfulness 
conception with equity? The classic discussion of these questions is 
provided by Aristotle in Book V, Chapter 10, of the Nicomachean 
Ethics: 
What causes the difficulty is the fact that equity is just, but not 
what is legally just: it is a rectification of legal justice. The expla-
nation of this is that all law is universal, and there are some 
things about which it is not possible to pronounce rightly in gen-
eral terms; therefore in cases where it is necessary to make a gen-
eral pronouncement, but impossible to do so rightly, the law takes 
account of the majority of cases, though not unaware that in this 
1384  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1365 
 
way errors are made. And the law is none the less right; because 
the error lies not in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature 
of the case; for the raw material of human behaviour is essentially 
of this kind.18 
This is the locus classicus for Aristotle’s view of epieikeia, which is 
usually translated as “equity” but can also be translated as “fair-
mindedness.” As Roger Shiner puts it,  
Equity is the virtue shown by one particular kind of agent—a 
judge—when making practical judgments in the face of the limita-
tions of one particular kind of practical rule—those hardened cus-
toms and written laws that constitute for some society that institu-
tionalized system of norms that is its legal system.19 
 But there is a problem with supplementing the lawfulness 
conception of the virtue of justice with the notion of equity. 
Understanding the problem begins with the fact that the virtue of 
equity seems to require the exercise of first-order private judgments 
of fairness. Once such judgments are admitted to have trumping 
force—to have the power to override the second-order judgment to 
rely on the public judgments embodied in the law—the question 
becomes how the role of private judgment can be constrained. 
Without constraint, private judgment threatens to swallow public 
judgment, and then we are on a slippery slope that threatens to 
transform the lawfulness conception into the fairness conception.  
 The trick is to constrain equity while preserving its corrective 
role. To put the point metaphorically, we need an account of equity 
that enables us to navigate the slope while providing sufficient 
traction to avoid slipping or sliding. An Aristotelian account of the 
virtue of equity gives us three points of traction. The first point of 
traction is provided by the distinction between the equitable 
correction of law’s generality and the substitution of first-order 
private judgments for the nomoi. Equity is not doing what the judge 
believes is fair when that belief conflicts with the law; rather, equity 
is doing what the spirit of the law requires when the expression of 
the rule fails to capture its point or purpose in a particular factual 
context. The second point of traction is provided by the virtue of 
justice itself. A judge who is nomimos simply is not tempted to use 
equity to avoid the constraining force of the law. A nomimos has 
internalized the normative force of the law; such a judge wants to do 
as the law requires. 
                                                                                                                     
 18. ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS  (J.A.K. Thom-
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 The third point of traction is provided by Aristotle’s 
understanding of the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom, or 
phronesis—think of the quality that we describe as “good judgment” 
or “common sense.”20 A judge with the virtue of practical wisdom, a 
phronimos, has the ability to perceive the salient features of particu-
lar situations. In the context of judging, we can use Llewellyn’s 
phrase, “situation sense,”21 or by way of analogy to the phrase “moral 
vision,”22 we can say that a sense of justice requires “legal vision,” the 
ability to size up a case and discern which aspects are legally impor-
tant. The phronimos can do equity because she grasps the point of le-
gal rules and discerns the legally and morally salient features of par-
ticular fact situations. 
 This account of equity can be contrasted with two rival accounts. 
On the one hand, we can imagine a conception of judging as pure eq-
uity—the idea that the judge would simply do the right thing in each 
particular fact situation. This conception of equity is simply a version 
of the fairness conception of the virtue of justice. On the other hand, 
we can imagine a conception of judging that limits equity to the van-
ishing point—perhaps to those cases where the application of the 
rule is truly absurd. Neither of these two alternatives offers a fully 
satisfactory account of the virtue of equity. The first alternative sac-
rifices the great goods created by the rule of law. The second alterna-
tive pays too high of a price for those goods and requires more rigid-
ity than is necessary. A constrained practice of equity done by judges 
who are both nomimos and phronimos combines the values of the 
rule of law with the flexibility to bend the rules to fit the facts when 
that is required by the purposes of the rules themselves. 
III.   DISCERNING EXCELLENCE 
 Excellent judges possess the judicial virtues. They are incorrupti-
ble and sober, courageous, good-tempered, impartial, diligent, care-
ful, smart, learned, skilled, just, and wise. But how can we tell which 
candidates for high judicial office possess these virtues? Knowing 
what judicial virtue is is one thing; knowing who possesses the judi-
cial virtues is another. In this Part, I argue that the discernment of 
virtue has three components—screening for judicial vice, detection of 
wisdom, and recognition of lawfulness. 
                                                                                                                     
 20. ARISTOTLE, supra note 18. 
 21. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 59-61, 121-57, 206-08 (1960). 
 22. See NANCY SHERMAN, THE FABRIC OF CHARACTER: ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF VIRTUE 
(1989). 
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A.   Screening for Judicial Vice 
 The first step in discerning excellence is the simplest. The initial 
screen for judicial excellence eliminates candidates who are incontro-
vertibly vicious—corrupt, ill-tempered, cowardly, unintelligent, or 
foolish. Screening for these vices is already a large part of the judicial 
selection process. Background investigations, conducted at the fed-
eral level by the FBI, seek to ferret out the moral vices. The solicita-
tion of comments by peers (lawyers and judges) is designed to elicit 
evidence of more subtle defects in character or intellect. 
 If we want to effectively screen for vice, we want to select judges 
(and especially Supreme Court Justices) from candidates who have a 
track record that is likely to expose these vices. This suggests that 
Supreme Court Justices ought to be selected from judges or lawyers 
who have extensive experience in public life. Serious moral and intel-
lectual defects may not be apparent at age thirty, but they are likely 
to have been exposed after two decades in public life. Luck may allow 
a cowardly or corrupt judge to flourish without incident for some 
span of years, but eventually vice will out. 
B.   Detecting the Phronimos 
 Mere absence of the worst vices is not enough. A good judge must 
possess the virtue of practical wisdom, or phronesis. Screening for 
vice is relatively easy; detecting the phronimos is likely to be both 
more difficult and more controversial. Before going any further, how-
ever, we ought to be careful not to exaggerate the problem. Practical 
wisdom is not an esoteric or mystic quality. Folk psychology recog-
nizes “practical wisdom,” which is frequently called “common sense.” 
Our intellectual and literary traditions are full of references to the 
wise—from King Solomon to Gandalf. Our ordinary lives involve in-
teractions with friends and colleagues whom we recognize as having 
good practical judgment; we ask them for advice and emulate their 
choices.23 Practical wisdom is harder to theorize than it is to recog-
nize. 
 The fact that we are able to recognize practical wisdom offers the 
key to the problem of discerning the phronimos. Persons of practical 
wisdom, phronimoi, are recognizable by those who know them and 
interact with them. This fact has consequences for judicial selection. 
The process of selecting judges should rely heavily on the recommen-
dations of those who are in a position to know whether the candidate 
possesses practical wisdom. 
 But this creates a special problem for the selection of Supreme 
Court Justices. The ultimate selector is the President, but the pool of 
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candidates is comprised mostly of judges. Given the separation of 
powers and the code of judicial ethics, judges may become clois-
tered—isolated from everyone but their friends and family, judicial 
colleagues, and law clerks. Opinions give evidence of craft and the in-
tellectual virtues but provide an imperfect window on the judge’s 
practical wisdom. For this reason, it is especially important that 
judges—at least those who would be willing to serve on the Supreme 
Court—engage in practical activities that expose them to public life. 
Civic or charitable activities and service on judicial commissions are 
two obvious opportunities for judicial immersion in a public life of 
practical activity. Supreme Court Justices should be selected from 
among those who have demonstrated their possession of practical 
wisdom, both from the bench and in wider public life. 
C.   Recognizing the Nomimos 
 If judicial opinions are an imperfect window on the virtue of prac-
tical wisdom, they are well suited for the task of recognizing which 
judges are lawful and which are results-oriented. Although disregard 
for the rule of law can be masked by clever opinion writing, a persis-
tent pattern of lawlessness is truly difficult to conceal. By way of con-
trast, a judge who is nomimos will strive to stay within the letter and 
spirit of existing law. Judges who believe in the rule of law attempt 
to give statutory or constitutional language its full due, eschewing 
interpretations that create unnecessary or artificial vagueness or 
ambiguity. Judges who believe in the rule of law will strive to follow 
precedent rather than evade it. 
 Of course, it might be possible for an ambitious lower court judge 
to feign the virtue of justice as lawfulness. But given the relatively 
small chance that any one judge has of appointment to the United 
States Supreme Court, it seems rather unlikely that many judges 
would choose to act as formalists when they are instrumentalists at 
heart. Judges with the vice of results-orientation are likely to wear it 
on their sleeve rather than conceal it underneath their robes. 
 In sum, we have good reason to believe that we can screen for 
vice, discern the possession of practical wisdom, and recognize true 
dedication to the rule of law. The fact that we have the capacity to 
recognize judicial virtue, however, does not entail that we can quan-
tify it. A tournament of virtue, on the other hand, promises some-
thing that might appear to be a very great good. If we can quantify 
indicia of judicial excellence reliably, then judicial selection might 
proceed on the basis of objective, publicly available criteria. The hard 
question is whether the variables that can be quantified are good 
proxies for true judicial virtues. 
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IV.   THE MISMEASUREMENT OF VIRTUE 
 Can we quantify judicial virtue? I will argue that the most rea-
sonable answer to this question is “no.” Before I do, however, we 
should examine the case for quantification, as stated by Choi and Gu-
lati. 
A.   The Case for Quantification 
 Choi and Gulati make the case for measurement by introducing 
the distinction between absolute and relative measurement of judi-
cial excellence: 
 Some will see the search for a set of objective measures as point-
less because they think that there is no way to measure or quan-
tify what it means to be a good, let alone great, judge. This is likely 
true as an absolute matter. Nonetheless, with a set of candidates 
with track records as lower court judges, it may still be possible to 
make meaningful relative evaluations. So, just as it is impossible 
to articulate what special factor makes Lance Armstrong the best 
cyclist in the world, it is impossible to reduce Justice Benjamin 
Cardozo’s greatness as a judge to numbers. But one can look at 
how many times Armstrong has won the Tour de France and com-
pare his numbers to those of his peers. Similarly, one can look at 
Justice Cardozo’s opinions and see how often they were cited by 
other judges, how often they were discussed in law reviews, and 
how often they made their way into casebooks. Justice Cardozo’s 
numbers can then be compared to those of his peers. As with Arm-
strong, this type of relative analysis does not give us a measure of 
his greatness or tell us what made him great. But it gives us a 
sense, even if imperfect, of how he performed relative to his 
peers.24 
In other words, they argue that we can develop an ordinal scale for 
judicial excellence, even if we cannot develop a cardinal scale.  
 Before we go any further, however, we ought to observe that the 
analogy that Choi and Gulati make between bicycle racing and judg-
ing is a rather tenuous one. In the case of bicycle racing, there is an 
objective and quantifiable measure of performance. The first to finish 
is the winner; participants in the race are ranked (both cardinally 
and ordinally) by time. In racing, the output of the contestants is ul-
timately the time it takes each racer to finish, which can easily be 
compared across racers. In judging, there are many outputs: rulings, 
opinions, jury instructions, and so forth. These outputs cannot easily 
be compared across cases and judges. There is no scale that permits 
objective comparisons to be made. 
                                                                                                                     
 24. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 1, at 30 (footnote omitted). 
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B.   Measuring the Wrong Qualities 
 Choi and Gulati’s error extends beyond the obviously fallacious 
nature of their analogy to racing. The measures they propose—for 
example, citation rates and productivity—not only fail to capture the 
essence of judicial excellence, they may, at least in some circum-
stances, measure judicial vice. Choi and Gulati assume that judges 
who write lots of opinions that are cited a lot are better judges than 
those who write fewer opinions and get fewer citations. But are these 
assumptions correct? 
1.   Citation and the Rule of Law 
 Choi and Gulati seem to assume that citation rate correlates with 
judicial excellence. Their argument for this conclusion is actually 
somewhat obscure. It begins with the idea that there is a “market” 
for judicial opinions: “We can look at the frequency with which a 
judge’s opinion is used by a variety of consumers (including, for ex-
ample, citation counts). Because circuit court judges write lots of 
opinions, the market test allows us to rank them in terms of the 
quality of those opinions.”25 In the accompanying footnote, they ex-
plain: 
 The view of judicial opinions as a market product available for 
consumption by judges, attorneys, and casebook writers has his-
torical roots. In the early days of the Supreme Court, judicial opin-
ions were typically recorded and distributed by private reporters. 
Reporters such as Cranch and Wheaton, for example, would record 
Court decisions, earning a return through private sales of their re-
ports. Indeed, across the Atlantic in England, it was common for 
multiple reporters to record the same judicial opinion, competing 
against each other based on the quality of the text they provided.26 
This passage does not, however, establish that the use of judicial 
opinions mimics a market in the respects that would be relevant to 
the notion that citation counts measure judicial excellence. The fact 
that reporters of opinions compete with each other on the basis of the 
accuracy of their reports does not entail that the authors of opinions 
compete with each on the basis of the quality of their decisions. Be-
cause this claim would be absurd, we can assume that Choi and Gu-
lati did not intend to suggest it, and that the footnote is merely re-
porting an interesting fact and is not intended to establish the con-
clusion that there is a market for the excellence of opinions. 
 Choi and Gulati continue the development of their claim about the 
market for judicial opinions: 
                                                                                                                     
 25. Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 1, at 306. 
 26. Id. at 306 n.21 (citation omitted). 
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 Markets do not always work well, however, and when they do 
not, they tend to be biased and inefficient. The problems that 
plague markets include asymmetric information, unsophisticated 
customers, and an inadequate number of producers (leading to oli-
gopoly pricing).27 
So far, so good. Choi and Gulati’s next claim, however, is problematic: 
 Unlike many other markets, however, the market for judicial 
opinions is relatively free of such imperfections. For one, judicial 
opinions may be obtained at no cost by judges and, in many areas 
of the law, are abundant.28 
“No cost” is ambiguous. Choi and Gulati are right if they simply 
mean that judges do not personally pay a monetary price for access to 
law libraries and electronic legal databases. But this does not mean 
that the production of citations to other judges’ opinions is cost-free. 
Citing is an expensive business, but the price is paid in terms of time. 
Finding opinions takes time. Reading them takes time. Citing them 
properly takes time. Choi and Gulati obviously know this; they are 
legal scholars and personally pay a price for the citations they pro-
duce. 
 The price that judges pay in terms of time is an opportunity cost. 
Whether judges research, read, and cite on their own or have their 
clerks do this work, the time devoted to this activity is not available 
for other activities. Moreover, the time resource is finite. A judge’s 
own time is finite; there are only so many hours in the day, so many 
days in the week, and so many weeks in the year. Clerk time is also 
finite; judges are limited in the number of clerks they can employ. 
Typically, this limit is quite rigid, and even if a judge wanted to hire 
additional clerks, the judge would not be permitted to do so.29 
 The fact that citations are costly has important implications for 
answering the question whether citation rates measure the quality of 
judicial opinions. If citations were free, then one might suppose that 
the only variable that would influence the decision of Judge A to cite 
an opinion by Judge B would be the quality of Judge B’s opinion. Of 
course, there are other variables, such as whether Judge B’s opinions 
are binding on Judge A, but let us set those complications aside. 
 If, however, Judge A’s decision whether to cite Judge B’s opinion 
is costly, then quality will not be the only variable. Another impor-
tant variable will be the costs of searching for Judge B’s opinion. If 
Judge B’s opinion turns up early in Judge A’s search for authority, 
then it will be more likely to be cited. As we all know, there are many 
                                                                                                                     
 27. Id. at 306. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Some judges do have the discretionary power to hire “externs,” or law students 
who perform some of the tasks that clerks do. 
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basic propositions of law for which many possible opinions could be 
cited. In each federal circuit, for example, there are opinions on basic 
procedural matters (standards of appellate review, standards for 
summary judgment, and so forth) where hundreds or thousands of 
prior opinions will state the proposition of law. 
 A rational judge will not read all of these opinions and cite the 
opinion that does the best job of stating the law. Rather, the rational 
judge will read enough authority to be reasonably sure of the correct 
statement of the rule. When it comes to citations, we would expect 
judges to “satisfice” and not “optimize.” The opinions that are cited 
are likely to be the opinions the judge encounters first, and as a prac-
tical matter, this means that they are likely to be the opinions that 
result from traditional research methods. For example, a Westlaw 
search will produce a list of opinions in reverse chronological order. 
Each opinion that deals with the issue will cite other authority, and 
the recently cited authorities are highly likely to be cited in the 
newly written opinion. Importantly, judges are highly likely to cite 
authority that is already widely cited. If a particular authority is 
cited in the cases returned by the research process, there is an in-
creased probability that the judge will cite that authority. And the 
more judges that cite the authority, the greater the likelihood that it 
will garner further citations. 
 Choi and Gulati continue their exposition, explicitly connecting ci-
tation rate with quality: 
 Indeed, the particular nature of the products (that they are free) 
means not only that competition is likely to occur effectively, but 
that we should be able to see clear and outright winners of the 
tournament. All judges will cite the best opinions. And to the ex-
tent certain “superstar” judges tend to write the best opinions, 
other judges will repeatedly look to these judges for guidance in 
the future. After all, given that the opinions all cost the same 
amount of money (zero), why not only use the best ones (even if the 
next best is only slightly worse)? This phenomenon of superstar 
judges does highlight one possible market defect: to the extent that 
most judges do not receive a large return from writing good opin-
ions, many will not have an incentive to do so. All things consid-
ered, though, we predict that the reporting of objective ratings will 
raise the likelihood that more judges will exert effort to become a 
superstar judge (given the high payoff from winning the tourna-
ment).30 
But Choi and Gulati’s claim—that all judges will cite the best opin-
ions—is clearly false once we look at citation through the lens of 
                                                                                                                     
 30. Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 1, at 307 (emphasis added). 
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networking theory. In the language of network economics,31 we can 
call this a process of “preferential attachment.”32 Opinions that are 
well situated in the network of citations will be cited many times; 
opinions that are more obscurely situated in the network will be cited 
rarely or not at all. The result is the so-called “‘rich get richer’ phe-
nomenon.”33 Opinions that are initially cited for a proposition will be 
cited over and over for that same proposition. 
 In other words, the citation rate of a given opinion (and hence of 
the author judge) will depend in large part on the position of the 
opinion in the ecology of the network of authority. The first opinion 
to state a given proposition will be likely to generate many citations. 
Subsequent opinions will be more likely to be cited if they are the 
most recent opinion stating the proposition; the time that a given 
opinion remains at the top of the stack (the first position in the re-
cency queue) will depend on the average frequency with which the 
proposition is stated at the time the opinion is issued. If the opinion 
of Judge C stating proposition X is at the top of the stack at a time 
when Judges D, E, and F are all working on opinions that also will 
state proposition X, then it is likely that Judge C’s opinion will be 
cited three times. But if Judge D states the proposition after Judge C 
and after Judges E and F have already finished researching their 
opinions, then Judge D’s opinion may never be cited at all. Moreover, 
once Judge C’s opinion has been cited by Judges D, E, and F, then it 
becomes highly likely that these judges will repeat their citations to 
Judge C’s opinion in future opinions. The repetition of the citation in 
their opinions increases the likelihood that other judges will cite 
Judge C’s opinion for the proposition. Occupying a very favorable 
node (or position in the ecology of the citations network) can result in 
an extraordinary number of citations; occupation of an unfavorable 
node can result in no citations at all. The important thing is that 
these differences can occur even though the proposition stated is ex-
actly the same. For this reason, citation rates do not necessarily 
track quality. 
 But this understates the problem with citation rates as a proxy for 
judicial excellence. Given the ecology of citation networks, it seems 
quite likely that frequency of citation will be a function of originality. 
The first case to state a proposition is, all else being equal, highly 
likely to become an important node in the citation network. Whereas 
                                                                                                                     
 31. I am greatly indebted to Tom Smith for his conversations with me on this point. 
See Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law (Jan. 3, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=642863. 
 32. Boris Galitsky & Mark Levene, On the Economy of Web Links: Simulating the Exchange Proc-
ess, FIRST MONDAY (Jan. 5, 2004), at http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue9_1/galitsky/index.html 
(discussing preferential attachment in the context of hyperlinks on the World Wide Web). 
 33. See id. (discussing the rich-get-richer phenomenon in terms of hyperlinks). 
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judges must choose between many opinions when choosing authority 
for an oft-repeated proposition of law, they only have one choice 
when selecting authority for a novel proposition of law instantiated 
in only a single prior opinion. But it is hardly clear that novelty 
makes for good law or that originality is a judicial virtue. This is not 
to say that originality is never appropriate, but a truly virtuous judge 
will only be original when the law itself requires originality. 
 Indeed, I have argued that the opposite is true under normal con-
ditions. The excellent judge is a nomimos, who follows the law rather 
than makes it. Good judges are clever in using the resources within 
existing law to solve the legal problems that come before them. The 
very best judges are experts at avoiding originality. And the very 
worst judges may be the most original. Very bad judges may use the 
cases that come before them as vehicles for changing the law, trans-
forming the rules laid down into the rules that they prefer. This kind 
of results-oriented or legislative judging may produce many original 
propositions of law and hence a high citation rate, but this is a meas-
ure of judicial vice and not judicial virtue. 
 This is not to say that a high citation rate is necessarily an indica-
tor of judicial vice. There are hard cases, in which some important is-
sue of law comes before a court for the first time. Some judges may 
have high citation rates because the luck of the draw has handed 
them a disproportionate share of cases with truly new legal ques-
tions. But even if this is so, it does not follow that these are the best 
judges. Luck is not virtue. 
2.   Productivity and Carefulness 
 What about productivity? Choi and Gulati suggest that a tourna-
ment of judges should include a productivity measure: 
The selection of a Supreme Court justice, therefore, should involve 
a prediction about the effort that a circuit judge is going to exert if 
elevated. Objective factors could focus on the effort that she ex-
erted while she was a circuit judge. We could look at how many 
opinions (versus short form dispositions) the judge published, how 
many concurring and dissenting opinions she wrote, how many 
opinions she wrote in which she took on primary responsibilities 
(as opposed to delegating to clerks), and the overall number of 
cases which she played a role in deciding during a given period of 
time.34 
But are the judges who write the most or longest opinions the best 
judges? Choi and Gulati have argued that short opinions are actually 
an indicator of judicial excellence, because shortness is a proxy for 
                                                                                                                     
 34. Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 1, at 309-10 (footnote omitted). 
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judges writing their own opinions as opposed to delegating that task 
to clerks.35 If total number of pages is not a good proxy for diligence, 
then what about the number of opinions written? It is certainly pos-
sible that the number of opinions written per time period is a proxy 
for judicial excellence, but this is not necessarily the case. The num-
ber of opinions written is surely a function of the number of opinions 
assigned. Assigning judges may attempt to equalize workloads; this 
might result in a judge who is given a difficult writing assignment 
being assigned fewer opinions. Or assigning judges might seek to 
equalize the number of writing assignments. The question whether 
there is a relationship between number of opinions written and judi-
cial excellence seems to depend on a variety of empirical questions 
and not to be well suited for armchair speculation. 
3.   Fame Versus Excellence 
 There is a more general problem with Choi and Gulati’s approach 
to measuring judicial excellence. The judges who are cited most and 
who write the most opinions may well be the judges who want to be 
famous, or at least “almost famous.” Fame and glory (or external rec-
ognition) are powerful motivators, but it is not clear that a desire for 
fame is a virtue for judges. Indeed, the claim that excellent judges 
seek fame and glory seems somewhat counterintuitive. 
 There is nothing wrong with a desire for external recognition; 
humans as social creatures may naturally desire recognition by their 
fellows. But an excessive desire for fame is likely to be inconsistent 
with judicial virtue. The virtue of justice—the central component of 
judicial excellence—requires that judges aim at giving litigants what 
they are due, that to which they are entitled by the rules laid down. 
To the extent that judges decide cases on the basis of a desire for the 
fame and glory that come with winning a tournament of judges, they 
risk departing from the actions required by the virtue of justice; to 
put it more bluntly, a tournament of judges may create incentives to 
do injustice in order to win. Justice may require a prosaic opinion 
that says nothing likely to garner oodles of citations. Winning the 
tournament of judges may encourage a more dramatic opinion that 
makes new law in order to garner attention. 
C.   Gaming the Tournament of Judges 
 If there were a tournament of judges that influenced the selection 
of Supreme Court Justices, we may confidently predict that some 
judges would play to win. That is, they would view the tournament 
                                                                                                                     
 35. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Which Judges Write Their Opinions (And 
Should We Care)?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1077 (2005). 
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as a tournament and devise strategies to maximize their chance of 
success. How might such a judge game the tournament of judges?36 
To simplify, let’s assume the tournament is scored by a formula 
which includes the following three measures: 
• Citations by lower courts, academics, and the Supreme Court.37 
• Productivity, including the number of majority and dissenting 
opinions written and the number of cases in which the judge par-
ticipated.38 
• Judicial independence, or the frequency with which the judge is in 
opposition to another judge selected by the same President (or a 
President from the same political party).39 
Let’s also assume that the judicial selection tournament will be 
viewed by both participants and third parties as a game, with payoffs 
determined by the selection of Supreme Court Justices. Judges who 
are selected would receive a large positive payoff, but other players 
(Presidents, Senators, judges, academics, and law clerks) would also 
receive payoffs—if judges whose ideology they shared became Su-
preme Court Justices. This assumption, that judges would play to 
win, is shared by Choi and Gulati: “Our proposal also recognizes that 
judges, like the rest of us, respond to incentives.”40 So how would the 
judges respond to the incentives? How might the game be played? 
1.   Gaming the Productivity Measure 
 Choi and Gulati propose that we measure the number of opinions 
and dissents as well as the number of cases in which judges partici-
pate. How could this measure be gamed? Tournament leaders will 
wish to maximize the number of opinions and dissents. If not as-
signed an opinion, a judge will have a strong incentive to dissent. If 
two politically aligned judges sit on the same panel and one of the 
two is a tournament leader while the other is not, there will be a 
strong incentive to hand the opinion to the leader. Circuits determine 
their own procedures for case assignments. A circuit with a tourna-
ment leader who is politically aligned with the Chief Judge and the 
majority of the judges on the circuit will have a strong incentive to 
provide more opinion-writing opportunities to the leader. This will 
advantage judges in friendly circuits and disadvantage judges in un-
friendly circuits. In the long run, however, there are only so many 
                                                                                                                     
 36. This portion of the Essay draws on a post from Legal Theory Blog. See Lawrence B. 
Solum, A Tournament for Judges. Mad? Brilliant? Clever?, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Apr. 17, 
2003), http://lsolum.blogspot.com/archives/2003_04_01_lsolum_archive.html#200162580. 
 37. Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 1, at 305-09. 
 38. Id. at 309-10. 
 39. Id. at 310. 
 40. Id. at 305. 
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ways to game productivity. Presumably, equilibrium will be reached 
among the judges who are tournament leaders—with each scoring in 
approximately the same range on this measure. 
2.   Gaming the Citation Frequency Measure 
 The opportunities for gaming this measure are obvious. Academ-
ics will now have an incentive to cite their favorites to influence 
tournament results. Likewise with both lower court judges and Su-
preme Court Justices. A set of second-order tactics will be likely to 
emerge. The composition of law school faculties can be influenced by 
state legislatures and by the wealthy alumni of private universities. 
The lower federal court benches are selected by the President and the 
Senate. Moreover, judges themselves can change their opinion writ-
ing so as to maximize the opportunities for both citing other judges 
(allies in the tournament) and for being cited. Opinions will become 
longer and long string cites will become the rule. Basic and uncon-
troversial issues will be discussed in depth. When faced with a choice 
between writing an opinion on an issue where there is no law—
because the issue arises infrequently—and an issue on which there is 
a lot of law—because the issue comes up all the time—the rational 
tournament participant will avoid the former and seek the latter. 
 Perhaps the most successful tactic for gaming the citation fre-
quency measure is also the most problematic. Judges will have an in-
centive to change the law, because an opinion that makes new law—
especially new law on a topic that arises frequently—is much more 
likely to be cited than an opinion that merely restates existing law. 
3.   Gaming the Judicial Independence Measure 
 Choi and Gulati propose that we measure independence by voting 
records.41 Judges would score points for voting against a judge ap-
pointed by a President of the same party as appointed that judge. 
There are several ways to game this measure. The most obvious way 
is to dissent when a same-party judge is in the majority and the deci-
sion would otherwise be unanimous. And, by the way, the judge try-
ing to win the tournament will also write a long, citable dissent that 
rehearses all of the basic law surrounding the case and cites all the 
judge’s allies in the tournament. Of course, there will be cases in 
which the players cannot decide contrary to party affiliation without 
changing the outcome. But if you are a tournament leader and the 
case is not on a hot-button issue about which you care deeply, it may 
well be in your interest to score some independence points by decid-
                                                                                                                     
 41. Id. at 310. 
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ing the case in a way you believe is wrong—and by writing a long 
opinion, of course! 
4.   Gaming Clerk Selection 
 Getting really good clerks is going to be very important in the 
tournament of judges. If you want to be a tournament leader, you 
will need to write a lot of very long opinions and dissents. Moreover, 
you need high-quality opinions, because they are more likely to be 
cited by other judges. So you want the best clerks. Supreme Court 
Justices can influence who gets the best clerks by informally signal-
ing that some judges are “feeder judges.” Clerks will want those 
clerkships, because they will lead to prestigious Supreme Court 
clerkships, which in turn will lead to prestigious academic positions, 
creating the opportunity to influence both citations and future clerks. 
The advantage added by the very best clerks is likely to be substan-
tial, and may well be decisive, given that citation frequency is the 
one measure among the three where an equilibrium ceiling is un-
likely to be established by the players. With great clerks, a stable of 
externs, and some high-quality politicking, it might be possible for a 
judge to garner many thousands of citations. 
D.   The Costs of a Gamed Tournament 
 In their original article, Choi and Gulati suggested that the tour-
nament of judges could be accompanied by a ban on discussion of any 
other merit-based criteria for judicial selection other than the tour-
nament results.42 When it comes time to select Supreme Court Jus-
tices, the tournament results will be the only information that Presi-
dents and Senators may use to justify their decision—other than po-
litical ideology. Assume that the tournament does, in fact, determine 
who is appointed to the Supreme Court. What price would we pay? 
1.   Damage to the Rule of Law 
 One thing that is very difficult to measure objectively is whether a 
judge has decided in accord with the law—rather than on the basis of 
either ideology or to gain an advantage in the tournament. The vir-
tue of justice is not rewarded in the tournament. No points are as-
signed for getting the law right. Moreover, too high a regard for jus-
tice is likely to be punished. Judges who vote based on the merits will 
lose opportunities to write opinions and dissents. Judges who agonize 
about getting it right will be diverting precious time from the oppor-
                                                                                                                     
 42. See id. at 313 (“To address the problem of political transparency, an extreme form 
of the tournament would be one that bars the president and the Senate from putting forth 
merit-related rationales outside our list of objective factors.”). 
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tunity to score points by getting it long, that is, producing lots of long 
and citable opinions. And judges who get it right are unlikely to pro-
duce opinions with lots of novel propositions of law—and hence lots 
of citations. 
2.   The Exclusion of Soft Variables 
 Practical wisdom, or phronesis, is a key component of judicial ex-
cellence, but the tournament of judges does not award points to 
judges who have common sense, which is the ability to size up a 
situation and penetrate to the issues that are truly important. In-
deed, the judges who possess this virtue are likely to be rather weak 
performers in the tournament of judges. They are likely to perceive 
that scoring points at the expense of doing justice is a rather poor ex-
cuse for judging. They are likely to lag behind their more canny and 
competitive colleagues. 
3.   Decreased Transparency 
 Choi and Gulati claim transparency as an advantage for the tour-
nament of judges,43 but the opposite may be the result of their pro-
posal. The tournament is likely to create an illusion of objectivity. 
Behind the scenes, however, there would be manipulation of opinion 
counts, citation counts, and independent decision counts. This will 
especially be true if one party controlled the Presidency, the Senate, 
the Supreme Court, and a majority of court of appeals slots at the 
beginning of the tournament. That party would have enormous stra-
tegic advantages in gaming the tournament, but the political nature 
of the selection process would effectively be masked by the appar-
ently neutral and objective basis that the tournament results would 
provide for the selection of Supreme Court Justices. 
4.   A Crisis 
 The end result of Choi and Gulati’s proposal would be so awful 
that one cannot imagine the story ending except in some kind of cri-
sis. You may not like the current Supreme Court, but imagine a court 
populated by judges who had won Choi and Gulati’s tournament. 
These judges would be without the virtues of integrity, wisdom, or 
justice. They would have been selected for the ability to manipulate 
the tournament results. In order to do this, the winning judges would 
be those who are willing to elevate self-interest over the interests of 
the public and the parties who appear before them. And these clever 
but vicious judges would be entrusted with the ultimate constitu-
tional authority. 
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V.   CONCLUSION: THE REDEMPTION OF SPECTACULAR FAILURE 
 If viewed as a serious proposal for reform of the judicial selection 
process, Choi and Gulati have a spectacularly bad idea—a real 
stinker. This can be true even if the retroactive application of Choi 
and Gulati’s selection criteria identifies excellent judges. The reason 
for this is obvious. No one had an incentive to game Choi and Gulati’s 
hypothetical tournament. The participants could not predict that the 
tournament would exist, and even if they knew that two law profes-
sors were conducting a hypothetical tournament, they would have 
very little incentive to play to win. All of this would change if the 
tournament of judges were actually implemented. Choi and Gulati 
recognize the imperfections of their measures of excellence and offer 
the following defense: 
 We will never succeed in generating a perfect objective measure 
of judicial quality. The point, however, is not whether objective cri-
teria perform better than a perfect system of judicial selection. 
Rather, the question is whether objective criteria work better than 
the selection process we have today. Given how politicized the se-
lection of Supreme Court justices currently is, the use of any objec-
tive factors will lead to a marked improvement.44 
But this argument fails on two counts. First, it is not necessarily the 
case that the use of objective factors would lead to a “marked im-
provement” in a gamed tournament. Such a tournament would select 
for those who are motivated by a desire to win the tournament and 
not by those who want to do justice. Choi and Gulati assume that the 
tournament will reduce the role of political ideology, but in a gamed 
tournament, that assumption is doubtful. Second, the reform of the 
judicial selection process—like most reform processes—is likely to 
involve path dependency and opportunity costs. If political capital 
were invested in a tournament of judges and we start down the road 
of judicial selection based on objective measurement of outputs, then 
it may become more difficult to focus on true judicial excellence. If 
the tournament of judges favors one ideological faction over another, 
the winning faction will have every incentive to preserve the tour-
nament. The opportunity cost of a real-world tournament of judges 
could well be loss of the chance for the implementation of real merit-
based judicial selection. 
 Sometimes, however, bad ideas spark good debates. We can view 
Choi and Gulati’s tournament of judges as a thought experiment 
rather than a proposal for reform. As a thought experiment, the 
tournament of judges is a marvel, precisely because it invites rigor-
ous analysis of the judicial selection process. In the end, Choi and 
                                                                                                                     
 44. Id. at 312. 
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Gulati’s tournament of judges invites us to ask two questions: What 
constitutes judicial excellence? and How can we select judges who 
possess them? Those questions are worth answering. 
